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The ‘Age of Faith’ and the ‘Age of Knowledge’: Secularism
and Modern Tibetan Accounts of Yogic Power

Annabella Pitkin

This paper approaches the dynamics of
secularization and post-secularism among
Tibetan Buddhists through the lens of ‘miracle’
narratives, both oral and textual. I argue that
such narratives function as a lightening rod for
complexities surrounding secularism and its
religious doubles. Tibetan Buddhist genres of
historical and biographical writing brim with
accounts of extraordinary yogic abilities (Skt.
siddhi, Tib. dngos grub and Skt. ṛddhi, Tib. rdzu
‘phrul), ranging from clairvoyance to flight.
Combining interviews with Tibetan Buddhist
scholars and practitioners, oral commentaries,
and textual analysis, I engage with analyses of
yogic power articulated by three contemporary,
primarily diaspora-based Tibetan Buddhist
scholar-practitioners. I argue that their
analyses of yogic power offer approaches
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to negotiating secularism, modernity, and
religious commitment using Tibetan Buddhist
philosophical tools, in ways that resonate with
contemporary debates about processes of
secularism in Asia and elsewhere.
Keywords: Tibetan Buddhism, biography, yogic power,
secularism, memory, modernity.

Introduction: Modernity, Secularism, and Yogic Power
Tibetan Buddhist accounts of extraordinary displays of
yogic power, sometimes described as ‘miracles’ in English,1
highlight complexities surrounding secularism and its
religious doubles. Reading other people’s minds, walking
on water, knowing the future — accounts of such activities
are familiar to millions of Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhists from the life stories of great Buddhist practitioners.
Yet narratives of extraordinary activities pose a potential
challenge for audiences today. How do practices of telling
or writing, listening to or reading, and reflecting on such
stories fit with the categories of secularism, rationalism
and modernity that are so influential in today’s globalizing
practices of knowledge production? Such questions resonate far beyond the Tibetan world.
A number of contemporary Tibetan Buddhist scholar-practitioners, both in diaspora settings and in geographic Tibet,
engage with these questions in ways that I argue contribute to ongoing debates among international scholars of
religion and theorists of modernity. I focus here on the
perspectives of three exile-based scholars from one particular lineage community, the Drikung Kagyu, a branch
of one of the four main traditions of Tibetan Buddhism
active today.2 Their interpretations are part of much larger
contemporary conversations about cultural change and
the role of religion happening across the Tibetan Buddhist
world. While I focus here on the perspective of Drikung
thinkers based outside geographic Tibet, many of the
intellectual currents these thinkers explore are transregional. In particular, Tibet-based intellectuals actively
engage parallel questions of memory, faith, and knowledge
in significant and influential ways, often in dialogue wit
diaspora thinkers, although I cannot fully address those
dynamics here.3
I had the opportunity to explore questions about secularism, modernity, and yogic power with three Drikung
Kagyu scholars in a series of conversations in 2013 and
2014 in Dehradun, India, and New York City. I spoke with
the senior yogic retreat master Dordzin Drubpon Dondrup Palden Rinpoche (Rdor ‘dzin sgrub dpon don grub
dpal ldan rin po che; colloquially abbreviated as Dordzin
Rinpoche), who lives in semi-permanent mountain retreat
in the southern Himalaya and is a leading instructor for
Drikung retreat practitioners, especially at the important
Lapchi retreat center in eastern Nepal; Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen (Mkhan chen nyi ma rgyal mtshan, b. 1976), who
is a khenchen (a leading khenpo, i.e., abbot/professor) of the
Kagyu Monastic College in Dehradun, India; and Karma
Rinchen (Karma rin chen, b. 1980), a lay scholar-practi-

tioner educated in classic Drikung monastic and yogic
curricula, who currently lives in New York City.
My conversations with them focused on displays of yogic
power attributed to one early modern Drikung Kagyu
master, a retreat hermit named Drikung Drubwang Amgön
Konchog Lodrö Rinpoche (‘Bri gung grub dbang a mgon
dkon chog blo gros rin po che). This practitioner, hereafter referred to as Amgön Rinpoche, lived from the late
19th to mid 20th century. Taking oral and written stories
of Amgön Rinpoche’s life as our starting point, Dordzin
Rinpoche, Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen
spoke with me about how to interpret accounts of yogic
displays in stories of Amgön’s and other masters’ lives.
Dordzin Rinpoche, Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, and Karma
Rinchen each brought a slightly different perspective to
bear on questions of secularism and yogic power, reflec ing both generational differences and distinctions in the
focus of their own intellectual and religious interests.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen was educated in Drikung monastic settings, primarily in India. Today he is a leading
Drikung teacher of international as well as Tibetan and Himalayan students, and his own scholarly and pedagogical
projects touch on questions of modernity and secularism
in a variety of ways. His extensive social media contacts
and his many international students and frequent international travel in Asia and North America give him a broad
perspective on the complex philosophical and cultural
environments in which contemporary Buddhists now
live. His incisive presentation of the relationship between
modernity, secularization, accounts of yogic power, and
Buddhist devotional priorities is at the core of my analysis in this article. He is a philosophical interlocutor with
whom I have found it extremely fruitful to think.
Karma Rinchen was Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s classmate
and, later, student, and was Dordzin Rinpoche’s personal
student for four years. He also has a multifaceted perspective, though his is slightly different than Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen’s. Karma Rinchen grew up in a nomadic area in
Gawa (sGa ba) in eastern Tibet, in the Kyura Terton Tshang
(sKyu ra’i gter ston tshang) family. He was educated in
monastic settings in geographic Tibet as well as in India,
and now lives a New York City lifestyle he characterizes
as “urban.” He uses social media to engage with friends in
Tibetan communities in many parts of the Tibetan world,
but is less involved with non-Tibetan social networks
than Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen. Karma Rinchen does not
currently hold a public role as a Buddhist teacher, but he
has been asked to teach on several occasions, and Tibetan
acquaintances turn to him for explanations of Buddhist
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ideas and practices. As a layperson with a wide acquaintance among Tibetan lay as well as monastic communities,
he describes his own perspective as bridging these views.
Dordzin Rinpoche speaks from the vantage point of someone a generation older than Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen
and Karma Rinchen. In a sense his is the most ‘traditional’
perspective I discuss here, though he, like the other two
scholars, is keenly attentive to contemporary dynamics of
change in the Tibetan Buddhist world. He is a deeply venerated senior retreat master, perhaps best known within
the Drikung community. He does not often travel outside
of the southern Himalayan region, or indeed leave his
retreat, although he has had several international students
seek him out at his hermitage. He is not active on social
media. Many of the stories about Amgön Rinpoche’s yogic
displays that he shared with me in 2013 involved people he
knew personally. Questions of memory and loss of memory
emerge as particularly important themes in his reflections.
Throughout our discussions of yogic power, Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen, Dordzin Rinpoche and Karma Rinchen all
articulated their interpretations of yogic displays using
classic Buddhist terminology. Yet they elaborated their
interpretations in ways that I argue work to significantly
reframe dominant international accounts of secularism
around the needs and concerns of present day Tibetan
Buddhists. I argue in what follows that in their discussions
of yogic power, Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, Karma Rinchen,
and Dordzin Rinpoche each challenge claims about the
non-rationality of Tibetan Buddhist practices and interpretations. Their interventions disrupt a range of reductive
views of Tibetan Buddhist intellectual life, which has been
variously caricatured both as deeply anti-modern, mired
in magic and superstition, and conversely as an idealized
‘rational religion,’ whose insights seamlessly mirror those
of the natural sciences. Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen in particular powerfully assert the central role
of reason in their understanding of Buddhism. At the same
time, their analyses also complicate the privileging of secularism and secularist accounts of rationality as uniquely
authoritative aspects of modernity. Highlighting considerations of time period and history, they situate questions
about yogic power and secularism within the wrenching
upheavals in the Tibetan Buddhist world since the 1950s,
in which religious connections and cultural identities
have become destabilized both in Tibet and in exile, and
narratives of past masters’ lives emerge as resources for
continuity and renewal.
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Amgön Rinpoche’s Yogic Displays
Amgön Rinpoche became famous for his exceptional
meditative achievements and for his remarkable activities,
including clairvoyance, extraordinarily rapid travel, and
his expansion of food, drink, water, snuff, and medicine so
as to render them inexhaustible. Stories about his yogic
displays are often funny, focusing on intimate and local details. One of the most well-known stories about him in both
oral and textual sources describes how he brought fresh
momo (Tibetan meat dumplings) from the city of Lhasa to
Drikung Monastery in the space of a few hours, dazzling a
group of incredulous young monks with a meal that was
still hot, having traveled the hundred and twenty or so
kilometers each way through his yogic power. Amgön Rinpoche remains a significant figure within Drikung lineag
memory still today among exile Tibetans, as well as within
geographic Tibet. Although exact dates for his life are difficult to determine, he lived from the late nineteenth to the
early twentieth centuries. A great master from the previous generation, Amgön Rinpoche’s activities are described
in two published biographies,4 and transmitted in many
oral narratives. These textual and oral narratives circulate
among present day Drikung Kagyu Buddhists living in Tibetan areas of the People’s Republic of China, in Dehradun
and the Indian Himalayan region, and in diasporic communities outside Asia.
I focus here on the interviews I recorded in 2013-2014 with
Dordzin Rinpoche, Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, and Karma
Rinchen, including their oral accounts and commentaries on Amgön Rinpoche’s activities. I have also consulted
textual religious biographies (rnam thar) of Amgön Rinpoche, in particular the 2004 biography by the Tibet-based
Drikung scholar Khenpo Konchog Gyatso (Mkhan po Dkon
mchog rgya mtsho, b. 1969), published in Lhasa, which
is currently the most well-known.5 When I use the terms
‘narrative’ or ‘life story’ in what follows, I am thus referring to the multiple strands of oral and textual material
that taken together form the basis for community memory
of an individual. My emphasis here, however, is on the
interpretations of yogic displays offered by the scholars
with whom I spoke, rather than on analysis of the textual
and oral narratives themselves. I examine these narratives
in detail in a forthcoming study.
The Drikung tradition, and Tibetan Buddhist traditions
more generally, offer many examples of yogic virtuosity, some closely paralleling Amgön Rinpoche’s. Amgön’s
activities, however, offer a revealing focus for several
reasons. Accounts of his life, including the most recently
published biography (Dkon mchog rgya mtsho 2004a),
emphasize his displays of yogic power, far more so than do

accounts of some other recent figures. (In general, while
Tibetan Buddhist biographic genres often depict displays
of yogic power, they do not always do so. The presence or
absence of such depictions vary partly for reasons I discuss
here, as well as for reasons connected to the Tibetan genre
distinctions of ‘outer,’ ‘inner’and ‘secret’ biographies.)6
Chronologically speaking, Amgön Rinpoche lived during
the first half of the twentieth century, prior to the social
dislocations and trauma of the 1950s in Tibet, but on the
eve of their occurrence. Many of Amgön Rinpoche’s own
students and their students are still alive, and stories about
him now circulate between geographic Tibet and exile
Tibetan communities. Thus although Amgön himself is one
generation removed, and lived most of his life in one place,
at Drikung Til Monastery, he is a figure who in many ways
bridges present and past, and connects Drikung communities across the spatial and temporal distances produced by
the profound changes of the twentieth century. In part because of this, present-day textual and oral accounts of his
activities are closely and explicitly linked. Stories about his
activities offer a fruitful context for discussing displays of
yogic power, together with questions of tradition, change,
and continuity.
According to the published biographies of his life, Amgön
Rinpoche was born in the latter half of the nineteenth
century in a humble rural community. As a young man he
practiced the full repertoire of Drikung Kagyu Buddhist
meditative and yogic practices, especially Mahāmudrā. He
was a non-celibate yogic practitioner (sngags pa) rather
than a monk, and lived most of his life as a deeply renunciant retreat hermit (mtshams pa) in a cave above Drikung Til
Monastery in central Tibet. Textual biographies and oral
accounts say he pursued a lifestyle of profound disengagement from ordinary worldly concerns.
Both the written biography and oral accounts emphasize
his persona of radical unconventionality. This persona is
itself a highly legible form of Tibetan religious virtuoso
behavior.7 The archetypes of the ‘crazy lama’ (bla ma smnyon ba) and the renunciant-hermit (bya bral ba) are longstanding ideals of Buddhist practice, familiar to Tibetans
from exemplary figures such as the foundational Kagyu
saint, Milarepa (1052-1135).8 Consider Amgön’s disregard
for clothing, money, food, and his own appearance; his
tendency to speak bluntly to everyone, even the powerful
nobility; the fact that he was sometimes perceived as crazy
by others. In these and other ways, Amgön Rinpoche’s life
and activities, including his display of yogic powers, are
described as embodying the renunciant ideals, unconventional style, and charismatic power of great yogic practitioners of the past.

Amgön was not well-established as a religious figure
initially. His 2004 biography describes him as sometimes
mocked by relatives, monks, and village people for his odd
ways. But by middle age he had begun to develop a reputation as a great practitioner. In his later years he became
rather famous. According to Khenchen Konchog Gyatso’s
biography of him (Dkon mchog rgya mtsho 2004a) and oral
narratives, eventually Amgön was sought out by devotees
from as far away as eastern Tibet (hundreds of kilometers
away from Drikung Til), and was often consulted by politically and socially influential people from Lhasa, like the
powerful Ragashar aristocratic family.
Most famously, following the death of the Thirteenth Dalai
Lama in 1933, Reting Rinpoche Thubten Jampel Yeshe
Gyaltsen (Rwa sgreng rin po che Thub bstan ‘jam dpal ye
shes rgyal mtshan, 1911-1947) consulted Amgön Rinpoche.
One of the most politically polarizing figures of the early
twentieth century in Tibet, Reting Rinpoche was a leading
Buddhist religious hierarch, who assumed the Regency of
Tibet after the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and was
placed in charge of locating the child who was the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Although Reting was ultimately ousted
from power, disgraced, and died under suspicious circumstances, during the period of his ascendency from 19351941 he was truly the ‘king’ of Tibet, as Amgön Rinpoche
is said to have ironically called him. Reting is described in
textual sources (including Dkon mchog rgya mtsho 2004a
and Dung dkar 1981) and in oral narratives as visiting
Amgön Rinpoche to request his help in locating the rebirth
of the Dalai Lama through his clairvoyant abilities. Owing
to this connection with Reting, Amgön Rinpoche became
known outside Drikung circles. For instance, the entry for
Amgön in the encyclopedia compiled by the prominent
twentieth century Tibetan scholar Dungkar Rinpoche
(Dung dkar 1981) focuses mainly on this connection with
Reting.
To give a flavor of the kinds of activities Amgön Rinpoche
is described as performing, let me briefly retell several
stories about him that Dordzin Rinpoche told me in 2013.9
These stories all highlight Amgön Rinpoche’s displays of
yogic virtuosity, each placing his yogic activity in a slightly
different social context, and making a range of social, moral and political points. Except for the last episode I present,
these are not necessarily the most famous narratives about
Amgön, although versions do appear in the 2004 textual
biography (albeit in less or differing detail). Yet these
narratives highlight key aspects of Amgön’s yogic activity
and serve as important crucibles for exploring potential
conflicts surrounding secularism and its religious doubles;
they were among the stories that Dordzin Rinpoche chose
to focus on when telling me about Amgön Rinpoche.
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At first glance, all Amgön’s actions in these stories appear
to demonstrate classic forms of yogic accomplishment,
such as clairvoyance, expansion or contraction of material
substances, and extraordinarily rapid locomotion. Such
yogic actions are often grouped within the repertoire of
yogic powers called siddhi in Sanskrit and ngödrup (dngos
grub) in Tibetan. These yogic powers are frequently taxonomized in Indic and Tibetan Buddhist literature (Swearer
1973; Orzech 1998; Kirti Tsenshab 2011; Gethin 2012), and
are presented in Buddhist sources as predictable consequences of meditative practice, in particular associated
with concentration (Skt. śamatha; Tib. zhi gnas) meditation.10 As we will see, however, the three Drikung scholars
whose interpretations I explore here did not frame Amgön
Rinpoche’s deeds as examples of ordinary ngödrup. Rather,
all three of them explained Amgön’s deeds as exemplifying
a different kind of yogic outcome, in a way that I argue is
central to their explanations of yogic power, modernity,
and the role of religious activity in contemporary Tibetan
society.
With this in mind, let us turn to the stories. The first
situates Amgön Rinpoche among the rural farmers and
herders with whom he grew up, and who were a majority
of his disciples. In this episode, Amgön Rinpoche encounters a stingy family who offers to act as his patron, and
Amgön displays what appear to be clairvoyance and the
yogic power of manipulating the size of objects and their
location in space. In Dordzin Rinpoche’s words, “Amgön
Rinpoche came to visit a family. The family said, ‘Do you
need anything?’ But Amgön Rinpoche said, ‘Nothing, nothing, there is nothing I need.’” The family pressed him to accept their support, and Amgön Rinpoche demurred several
times. “Finally Amgön Rinpoche said, ‘I want firewood.’ In
reply, the family said, ‘We have no firewood.’” Here the i plication in the story, borne out by the comments of other
people with whom I listened to the story including Karma
Rinchen, is that the family was being ostentatious, making
a show of offering to materially support Amgön, but not
being sincere.
But, as implied in the oral account, Amgön Rinpoche knew
that they were being evasive, and that the family had a
great deal of dried yak dung, suitable for fuel. “Amgön
Rinpoche said, ‘I will accept the dried yak dung fuel.’ The
family protested and said, ‘We’d like to give you the yak
dung but we have no way to offer it to you — you live
too far away and we have no way to transport it to you.’
Amgön Rinpoche said, ‘Will you really give it to me? If you
will give it to me then I have a way to transport it myself!’”
And, paraphrasing here, since the details of the story are
confusing without gestures, he took off his monk’s shawl
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and swung it over the large expanse of the yak dung and
tied up the corners of the shawl as if making a package.
Then suddenly it was as if all the yak dung was inside his
shawl, although the shawl was still of a dimension that
Amgön Rinpoche could carry, and he had not moved to
walk around collecting the dung and putting it in the
shawl. “Then he took the whole lot away with him.”11
This particular episode provoked many comments, both
when Dordzin Rinpoche first told it to me and a Tibetan
colleague in 2013, and later when I listened to a recording
of it with Karma Rinchen and another Tibetan companion.
On both occasions, people listening commented, “That
story really sounds like ‘magic’ (using both the English
term ‘magic’ and the Tibetan term sgyu, for illusion). Both
Dordzin Rinpoche and subsequently Karma Rinchen took
pains to explain that although this story of the yak dung
sounds like ‘magic’ it is not. Likewise, and importantly,
they both commented that in terms of genre, although
this episode now sounds like a ‘folktale’ (sgrung), it is not.
According to Karma Rinchen and Dordzin Rinpoche, this
and similar accounts of Amgön Rinpoche’s activities are in
a different narrative category, that of religious biography
(rnam thar).12 Where the term ‘folktale’ might evoke connotations of unbelievability for some listeners, these episodes should not be misunderstood in that way. As Karma
Rinchen put it, “Amgön Rinpoche’s display was ‘real’ (dngos
gnas);” i.e., it was not merely an illusory display.
Both Dordzin Rinpoche and Karma Rinchen paused here to
explain that stories about yogic displays like this change
over time, both in terms of what stories can be told, and
how they are received. According to Dordzin Rinpoche, it
is because of massive changes in the Tibetan world in the
years after 1959 — in particular, the tragic deaths of many
lamas who personally knew Amgön Rinpoche and could
talk about him from direct experience — that stories about
Amgön now are starting to sound like ‘folktales,’ despite
the fact that they are not. Dordzin Rinpoche said in this
context, “It is now difficult to tell or write the stories of
Amgön Rinpoche,” because so many living sources are
gone. Dordzin Rinpoche also lamented the erosion of memory, in this case his own, saying, “I knew or heard many
Amgön Rinpoche stories over the years, but mostly [now]
I have forgotten.” Karma Rinchen added, when listening
to this conversation in recorded form, “There used to be
many such remarkable lamas with such qualities, but now
people don’t believe it.” This comment suggests that the
facticity of Amgön’s deeds appears to recede, as the links
of memory and belief are altered. I return to these points
about memory, change and continuity below.

The next story places Amgön at his monastery in the midst
of a conflict with other, more conventional monks, and
suggests that his unconventional persona and reputation
for extraordinary qualities did not always sit well with
the monastic community. In the story, the other monks at
Drikung Til got fed up with Amgön Rinpoche’s crazy ways.
In Dordzin Rinpoche’s words, “The retreat-yogi Amgön
Rinpoche had a strange, unusual personality. Because of
this, many Drikung monks said he was crazy and wanted to
expel him from the monastery. But when they told Chetsang Shiwe Lodro, he said to them, ‘If you expel him then I
too will leave!’” Drikung Chetsang Rinpoche Tenzin Shiwe
Lodrö (‘Bri-kung Che tshang rin po che bstan ‘dzin zhi ba’i
blo gros, 1886-1943) was the sixth Chetsang Rinpoche and
thirty-seventh co-head of the Drikung lineage.
“So the monks decided to get rid of Amgön Rinpoche
secretly, without telling Chetsang Rinpoche. They went to
Amgön’s retreat cave and took all his things and him and
went to throw him out.” Drikung Til is located on a high
mountain ridge, and the main monastery gate is located at the end of an extremely long winding road up the
mountain. The monks here seem to have deposited Amgön
Rinpoche and his few possessions down at the foot of the
mountain, at the beginning of the steep ascent. However,
“When they returned to the monastery they found he had
already returned there before them,” somehow having
re-climbed the steep hill extraordinarily fast, and without
being seen. This happened not once but twice, after which
the monks who wished to expel Amgön Rinpoche gave up
and left him alone. Dordzin Rinpoche emphasized that this
was a story he had heard from others in the Drikung Til
community who had known about it directly, although he
had not witnessed it himself.
This account shows Amgön Rinpoche displaying what
appear to be the yogic accomplishments of rapid locomotion and “making what is near far and far near” (Gethin
2012). They also hint at beloved qualities of humor (the
mean monks are so surprised when they cannot eject him)
and cleverness that are closely connected with the ‘crazy
lama’ or ‘saintly madman’ personae that Amgön apparently embodied. This story also illuminates the diversity
of styles and practices potentially coexisting within a
single Tibetan Buddhist monastery, ranging from Amgön
Rinpoche’s yogic virtuosity to more conventional monastic
approaches to propriety, and the potential for conflict b tween the two. Here the conflict is resolved by the ‘trump
card’ of Amgön Rinpoche’s extraordinary qualities, which
indicate (as does the wholehearted defense of Amgön by
the revered head of the lineage) that Amgön Rinpoche’s
style of practice and accomplishments are supreme, even if
misunderstood by those of limited capacities.

The final story I will retell here depicts the relationship
between Amgön Rinpoche and Reting Rinpoche, the powerful Regent of Tibet, a topic extensively discussed in the
2004 textual biography. Dordzin Rinpoche’s oral account
was briefer than the 2004 biography, which reports many
visits by Reting to Amgön and numerous funny exchanges of dialogue; Dordzin Rinpoche’s oral account instead
emphasized the personal quality of Amgön Rinpoche’s
clairvoyance and the idiosyncratic but politically insightful way he revealed his visions. This episode touches on
famous historical events with enormous consequences for
Tibetan society, and encapsulates the dynamics of political
controversy connected to these events in multiple ways.
In the version Dordzin Rinpoche recounted to me, “Reting Rinpoche came to ask Amgön Rinpoche, ‘Where is the
next Dalai Lama reborn?’ Amgön Rinpoche answered, ‘If I
answer, the Lhasa government won’t like it. But [actually]
Gyalwa Rinpoche [the Dalai Lama] was born in India, Lhasa,
[and] Amdo.’ Then Reting Rinpoche said, ‘Please, please
[explain],’ and begged Amgön to tell him what he knew
by his pure perception. So Amgön Rinpoche [clarified]
and said, ‘Near the Blue Lake [Kokonor, in Amdo, where
the Fourteenth Dalai Lama was in fact born] in sheep skin
clothing, there he is.’”
Dordzin Rinpoche summed this up by saying, “It all turned
out as Amgön said: His Holiness was born in Amdo, the son
of herder-farmers (which explains the sheepskin), then he
went to Lhasa, and then he left and went to India.” Karma
Rinchen, with whom I listened to a recording of this account, further explained that Amgön’s statement that “the
Lhasa government would not like it if he prophesied about
Amdo, Lhasa and India” was Amgön’s complicated way of
saying that he had foreknowledge of the events surrounding the coming end of the then Lhasa government, perhaps
even hinting at the events that were to come in the 1950s;
however, this would have been impolitic to say directly. Here, despite the narrative context of clairvoyance
and Amgön’s persona as a ‘crazy’ hermit, we see Amgön
remembered as an astute observer of political realities on
many levels.
“Tibetans are ‘International’:” Secularism and Modernity
as Forms of Social Capital13
So how should contemporary listeners understand and respond to these narratives? This was the question I posed to
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, Dordzin Rinpoche and Karma
Rinchen; it formed the starting place for our discussions.
Although each scholar brought a slightly different perspective to reflecting on this question with me, Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen, Dordzin Rinpoche, and Karma Rinchen all
began by emphasizing that within the Tibetan Buddhist
HIMALAYA Volume 36, Number 1 | 101

context, witnessing a display of yogic power (as a bystander, as a subsequent narrator, or as a listener/reader) implicates a person in multiple acts of interpretation, devotion,
and memory. These acts of interpretation, devotion, and
memory are conditioned by the specific historical moment
and cultural location in which the witness finds him or
herself, and how close he or she is to the event.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen further
noted that neither displays of yogic power nor Buddhist
ways of talking about them are new. Indeed, Buddhist ways
of talking about displays of yogic power are attributed
directly to the historical Buddha Śākyamuni. What is new
however, in their view, are the particular ways in which
contemporary Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhist communities now engage with such displays, and with the practices
of recollecting them through story and memory.
According to both Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma
Rinchen, our present historical moment has distinctive
implications for people around the world, including for
Tibetan Buddhist practitioners. This novelty of the present
day has direct consequences for how individuals and
communities witness and respond to displays of yogic
power. Shifts in how people relate to such displays are not
limited to Tibetan Buddhists from Tibetan or Himalayan
backgrounds. However, throughout our discussions, both
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen emphasized
the changes occurring in particular for ‘Himalayan people’
(Hi ma la ya mi), a phrase Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen used,
and which Karma Rinchen picked up on in our subsequent
discussions after I mentioned it to him.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen defined the term ‘Himalayan
people’ in the context of our discussion as referring to
Tibetan Buddhists from culturally linked areas of the geographic Himalayan region, in particular from Tibet, Khunu
(Kinnaur), Nepal, Ladakh, Bhutan, and Sikkim, as well as
Buddhist people from those regions now living elsewhere.
Our discussion focused only on Buddhist responses to accounts of yogic power, and did not explore Hindu or Muslim ideas, although many Himalayan communities include
people from multiple religious traditions neighboring one
another. Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen used the general term
‘Himalayan people’ and sometimes spoke specifically about
‘Tibetans’ (Bod pa), in the context of highlighting changes
in the post-1959 Tibetan cultural world across the Himalayan geographic region, and in the attitudes and practices
of Himalayan Buddhists generally.
All three Drikung scholars I spoke with, and especially
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen, explicitly framed their comments about interpreting Amgön
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Rinpoche’s extraordinary displays first by situating
contemporary Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhists within
the temporal space of the ‘modern.’ They used the English
term ‘modern,’ as well as Tibetan phrases like ‘present
day people,’ (deng sang gi mi rabs) or ‘modern times’ (deng
rabs), ‘our generation’ (nga tsho’i mi rabs), and ‘the new
generation’ (mi rabs gsar pa). Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and
Karma Rinchen explicitly located themselves within this
generational category. In parsing distinctive elements of
this ‘new generation,’ they highlighted specific contemp rary circumstances of Tibetan exile, diaspora, and international travel, and framed these as qualitatively different
from long-distance travel in which Himalayan people have
traditionally participated. In Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s
words, “Previously the situation was different: the members of the lineage community were connected, all in one
place. But post-1959 the situation is different. Each lineage
is now international,” he said, using the English term. “In
fact, Tibetans are international.”
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s use of the English term ‘international’ to gloss the Tibetan experience of post-1959
diaspora is a powerful intervention, one that acknowledges
a painful reality of displacement and disempowerment
concealed beneath the veneer of a new globalism.14 For
many Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhists, the mid-twentieth century indeed appears as a crucial historical watershed. The incorporation of Tibet into the newly established
People’s Republic of China (PRC) after 1949, the 1959 flight
of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans into Indian exile,
and the establishment of Tibetan diaspora communities
in India and elsewhere around the world are often seen by
Tibetans and outsiders as marking a profound social and
historical transition, although the nature of this transition
is often debated.15 This transition calls into question the
transmission of inherited religious and cultural material.
It profoundly — maybe permanently — destabilizes the
relationship between past and future in Tibetan settings,
opening new questions about the continuity of Tibetan
identities, Buddhist transmission lineages, institutions, and
social practices of all kinds (cf. Shakya 2000; Hartley 2008).
These questions about Tibetan cultural continuity and
religious identity are asked against a historical backdrop
composed of multiple strands of Chinese and western
secularism. Here, secularist claims are linked inextricability to assertions of secular modernity and social progress.
Influential Chinese nationalist projects have posited se ularism as central to modernity since the late Qing, with
both Nationalist and Communist Chinese governments developing new categories of religion and secularism, often
in dialogue with or against Western evolutionary theories

of society and religion. Some Chinese thinkers posited
the complete disappearance of religion as a mark of social
progress (Duara 1995; Yang 2008). Although Tuttle (2005)
argues that such an approach to secularism was not monolithic, the waves of temple destruction and persecution of
religious practitioners that occurred during the Cultural
Revolution, for instance, suggest how literally such views
could be enacted. Tibetan communities in diaspora and
within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have repeatedly found their social, intellectual, and religious practices
being ‘evaluated’ via the categories of western and Chinese
secular modernities (Cabezon 2008; Kolas 2008; Yang 2008,
2011; Duara 1995). As Shakya (2000) points out, Chinese
colonial projects in Tibetan areas have emphasized “the
notion of underdevelopment (rjes lus),” implying “that
Tibet lagged behind in technology, and more importantly,
that it was culturally stagnant and backward.”16 This in
turn echoes European colonial attitudes and ambitions toward both Tibet and China in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
Earlier North American and European accounts of secularism often presented secularism as an opposite of religion,
and as an intrinsic, necessary component of modernity.
Such views often built on Weberian notions of a progressive (though painful) ‘disenchantment’ of the world. Secularism in this sense is associated with privileged claims to
realism, naturalism, and a scientific world-view. Religion,
by contrast, appears extra-rational, irrational, or connected with anthropological categories of myth, magic, and
symbol (Asad 2003; Casanova 2011). This type of secular/
religious binary has often been mapped onto to a separation between a modern present or a future of innovation,
and a traditional past from which people must break to
be modern (Benavides 1998; Hervieu-Léger 2000).17 In this
context, Buddhist accounts of yogic power potentially provoke a range of tensions and ambivalences. These include
western secular anxieties about anti-modern or ‘pre-modern’ cultural Others. In this formulation, western convert
Buddhists may display anxiety over the fact that Tibetan
Buddhists cling to ‘irrational’ beliefs; conversely, some Tibetans may be concerned that accounts of yogic power will
make outsiders look down on Tibetan Buddhist society.
Asian Buddhist communities have often had to wrestle
with special versions of the anxieties of secularism, often
framed in terms of persistent conceptual extremes (Lopez
1998; Almond 1988; Ivy 2005; relatedly Hansen 2003). On
one hand, some often-sympathetic presentations of Buddhist ideas and practices describe Buddhism as a rational
system of meditation instructions primarily aimed at the
individual. In this formulation, Buddhism offers psycholog-

ical insights, health benefits, and positive or ethical mental
states, as well as (more recently) useful understanding
about brain function and other neurological phenomena.
In this view, Buddhism sometimes appears more intrinsically rational, compatible with science, and ‘naturally’
modern than most, if not all, other religions.18 This view of
Buddhism develops via specific European, often Protestant,
projects of knowledge dating from the colonial period,
in which notions of rational, non-theistic and ritual-free
Buddhism were mobilized by European scholars to critique
both European forms of religion and Buddhism as actually
practiced by Asian Buddhists (Almond 1988; King 1999;
McMahan 2008; Lopez 1998; Blackburn 2010; Turner 2014).
At the other extreme, Buddhist communities and practices have been presented by non-Buddhist scholars and
by some Buddhist reformers as profoundly non-rational,
even anti-rational, and thus as incompatible with (often
nationalist) projects of modernity (Almond 1988; Lopez
1998, 2005, 2006).19 In such presentations, Asian Buddhist
communities’ involvement in ritual or in practices invoking supernatural phenomena and apotropaic concerns (including blessings, amulets, mantras, protective substances,
relics, pilgrimage and circumambulation) are seen to
disqualify them from both rationality and modernity. Also
problematic from such perspectives are Buddhist practices
of devotion and patronage to teachers and institutions as
well as monastic education systems emphasizing Buddhist
texts and rituals, rather than ‘modern’ international secular topics such as science and math (Almond 1988; Lopez
1998; Blackburn 2010; McDaniel 2011; Bubandt and van
Beek 2012; Turner 2014).
Tibetans have found themselves positioned within these
representations of Buddhism in almost every conceivable
way (Lopez 1998). Some authors have presented Tibetan
Buddhism as the most rational and science-compatible
of present-day Asian Buddhisms—a kind of ideal modern
religion. Others have presented Tibetan Buddhists as the
most benighted, backward, and superstitious (Lopez 1998;
King 1999; Yang 2011). In a kind of mystical super-Orientalist-reversal, some observers of Tibetan societies have
even singled out what they see as the ‘non-secular’ and
‘non-modern’ elements of Tibetan culture as its only
valuable, authentic, or marketable aspects, relegating all
modern or secular forms of Tibetan culture to the margins
or dismissing them as inauthentic (Lopez 1999; Kolas 2008;
Jabb 2012; Yeh and Coggins 2014). Tibetans in the diaspora
who inhabit new roles as refugees, clients, or religious fi ures with international and convert followings have found
they must increasingly navigate this spectrum of challenges to the legitimacy of Tibetan Buddhist practices and
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narratives (Prost 2006, Zablocki 2009). Tibetan secular and
religious intellectuals, both in exile and inside Tibet, have
themselves also debated competing claims about cultural
authenticity, modern Tibetan identity, and the effects of
secular versus religious nationalism (Diehl 2002; Yeh 2007;
Hartley 2008; Robin 2008; Bhum 2008).
In this context, Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhists often find they must simultaneously engage international
claims and assumptions about secularism, rationalism,
and modernity, while also facing ever more urgent tasks
of maintaining continuity and the face-to-face ritual and
social spaces of lineage cohesion and community. Dordzin
Rinpoche’s poignant remark that it is now hard to tell stories about Amgön Rinpoche’s deeds, because many people
who knew Amgön personally are dead and he himself has
forgotten many stories he knew, comes to mind here. This
comment illustrates the high stakes of maintaining lineage
memory and the difficulties therein. At the same time, the
above overview of international assumptions about secularism and rationality highlights the challenges of memory
work when non-secular claims are being made, such as
those about yogic power. It is precisely these challenges
that Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen arguably navigate, with their framing of the Himalayan ‘new
generation’ and the shifts in how ‘Himalayan people’ now
respond to stories about yogic power.
To further contextualize their comments, it is helpful to
briefly sketch some of the innovative institutional steps
the Drikung lineage has taken to address practical aspects
of lineage cohesion and continuity. Since the 1990s, the
Drikung community in Dehradun, India, has built a group
of religious, cultural, and educational institutions.20 These
include the Drikung Institute and Songtsen Library for
Tibetan and Himalayan Studies, an institution focused
on Tibetan history which hosts international academic
conferences as well as Buddhist meditation retreats and
rituals; Samtenling Nunnery, a monastic center for women; Jangchubling Monastery, the main exile seat of the
Drikung Kagyu lineage; and the Kagyu College, an updated
version of a traditional Drikung Kagyu shedra (bshad grwa),
or monastic commentarial school, of which Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen is a leader. The public presentation of these
institutions, in their architecture, curricula, scholarly and
religious affiliations, websites, and programming, incorp rate attention to both Tibetan and international modernist
ideas about what Buddhism should be. Yet these institutions also have been constructed explicitly to maintain
Drikung educational, ritual, and intellectual continuity in
the contemporary world, with special focus on the Tibetan
diaspora.
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Technology and social media also play an important role in
Drikung adaptations to the international diaspora. Drikung
leaders and teachers like H.H. Drikung Chetsang Rinpoche
(the diaspora-based head of the lineage), Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen, and administrators at Drikung institutions now
make use of social media and communications technologies, including Skype, podcasts, live streamed broadcasts,
Facebook, and WeChat to reach students around the world,
and to connect far-flung members of the lineage to each
other. Many Drikung people routinely use services like
WeChat or Facebook, not only socially but to listen to Buddhist lectures and join Buddhist discussion groups. In this
the Drikung Kagyu community is not at all unique. These
technologies now contribute to the transmission of Asian
and international Buddhist materials and community ties
in lineages across the world. These technologies constitute
one element, though not necessarily the most important,
of Tibetan Buddhist engagements with practices often
represented as modern. Although as Lawrence (1989) and
others point out, technology and modernity are hardly
synonymous, these technological tools work to reframe
the physical and imagined spaces of the Drikung lineage,
linking an expanded range of Tibetan Buddhist social
worlds across geographic and temporal distances.
Yet the above mentioned Dehradun-based Drikung
institutions also serve as in-person gathering places for
masters and students from across the Drikung lineage
world. They satisfy a need for personal lineage connections in a way technology seems not to do.21 Even elderly
or ill practitioners will travel long, expensive distances to
participate in major community events. In-person gatherings maintain a face-to-face community of ritual, teaching,
and relationship based on physical travel and assembly
rather than solely mediated by technology. The 2013 twomonth long Winter Teachings gathering in Dehradun, for
instance, brought together Drikung masters with international Buddhist centers in Asia, Europe and North America;
long-term meditators from cave hermitages and isolated
monasteries in the Himalayan region, Ladakh, north India
and Nepal; and monks, nuns and lay people from Drikung
communities around the world. Not coincidentally, it was
in this setting that I conducted many of the interviews on
which this article is based.
Making Sense of Yogic Power: Siddhi, Dzuntrül and
Recollection
In the ‘international’ diaspora context Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen describes, accounts of the lives of past masters
remain crucial, as a source of continuity, history, and identity. Indeed, as I discuss, recalling accounts of past masters

is a crucial component of maintaining the kind of face-toface community that Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhists
(and others) prioritize. Yet life stories (textual and oral)
of past masters also challenge new generations and new
kinds of readers with tales of extraordinary yogic feats that
scandalize international secular and modernist norms.
In our conversations, Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, Karma
Rinchen, and Dordzin Rinpoche addressed this potential
conflict for contemporary Tibetan Buddhists, between
the need to learn about lineage masters’ lives, versus
the non-secular or non-modern sounding content of life
stories, especially where accounts of yogic power are concerned. They explained the mechanism by which practices
of reading or listening to life stories are linked from a Buddhist point of view to yogic practices of self-cultivation,
memory and devotion.
Explanations by Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, Dordzin Rinpoche, and Karma Rinchen all hinged on the need to distinguish two different levels of yogic power or yogic display.
One level of yogic power is ngödrup, which I translate here
as ‘displays of yogic power’ (Skt. siddhi, Tib. dngos grub).
These are powers produced as a side effect of concentration meditation and/or tantric practice, according to
mainstream Indic and Tibetan Buddhist treatises. These
ngödrup yogic powers, extraordinary as they may seem to
bystanders, are generally classified in Buddhist texts and
oral exegesis as ‘ordinary’ (thun mong). The only non-ordinary yogic power in this sense is Buddhahood, also called
‘the supreme yogic power’ (mchog gi dngos grub).
This supreme form of yogic power, i.e., enlightenment, can
also manifest in a display, which disciples or potential disciples can witness. This second type of yogic display should
be named differently, to distinguish it from the ‘ordinary’
ngödrup powers. It is termed ‘supreme display’ (mchog gi
rdzu ‘phrul; hereafter dzuntrül for short) and is described
as enlightenment simply manifesting. Thus while Amgön
Rinpoche may seem to be displaying ‘ordinary’ yogic abilities, i.e., ngödrup, in the above stories, he is not. Rather, he
is spontaneously displaying his enlightened state, dzuntrül,
which I will translate here as ‘display of realization.’
Multiple Buddhist traditions make such distinctions, and
insist that, remarkable as they may seem to bystanders,
ngödrup abilities are totally ordinary in an ultimate sense,
i.e., by contrast to Buddhahood. Tibetan exegetes, like
Indian authors before them, state that Buddhahood is the
only supreme yogic accomplishment. Ordinary ngödrup are
powerful, and often delightful and thrilling to witness or
recount. They are popularly beloved across the Buddhist
world. But as Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, Dordzin Rin-

poche, and Karma Rinchen all stated, from a Tibetan Buddhist soteriological perspective, ngödrup are fundamentally
a distraction from the real goal, which is Buddhahood.
Moreover, ngödrup also problematically resemble magic, or
illusion (Tib. sgyu, Skt. māyā). Tibetan and Indian authors —
both in the contemporary period I discuss here, but also in
earlier strata of Buddhist writings — often frame magical
illusion as a fraught, primitive category of naïve falsehood or manipulation (in a way that curiously resonates
with certain earlier western anthropological claims about
primitivism, religion, and modernity). Concern about the
slippery and stigmatized categories of magic and illusion
may indeed have something to do with the discomfort my
Tibetan colleagues expressed at the thought that I might
perceive Amgön Rinpoche’s activities as a type of ordinary magic or ‘super power.’ In the context of discussing
Amgön’s deeds, my three interlocutors all deployed ‘magic’
in our discussions as a pejorative term, connoting unreality, and suggesting credulity on the part of audiences
and charlatanry or manipulation by performers. Karma
Rinchen for instance noted that “people today” don’t
believe in magic, and commented, in relation to Amgön
Rinpoche moving the yak dung, that “it looks like mere
magic, it is hard to believe.”22
Inappropriate yogic displays of ngödrup are frequently
highlighted as a problem in canonical Indic and Tibetan
Buddhist literature. In sūtra passages the Buddha Śākyamuni expressly criticizes attachment to or displays of ngödrup
and forbids monastics from performing them (Gethin 2012;
Strong 2007). Inappropriate yogic displays are said to work
against the Buddhist community, either by increasing
the resistance of skeptics, by making credulous people
believers for the wrong reasons, or by making Buddhist
monks appear to be simply one among many groups of
wonder-working specialists (Gethin 2012; Gomez 1977). An
important rationale for Buddhist caution about ngödrup
powers indeed appears to be the fact that they are understood as not unique to Buddhists, but simply as the predictable side-effect of certain meditative techniques. Only
Buddhahood is distinctive, in the sense of being uniquely
produced by the Buddhist path. As Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen commented, “Americans think meditation leads
to ‘miracles’ [using the English term ‘miracle’], but this is
not the real point. All sorts of religions have miracles, so
miracles themselves cannot be the key.” These older Buddhist criticisms of ngödrup seem to resonate deeply with
contemporary concerns about modernity and secularism
for certain contemporary Tibetan Buddhists.
Dzuntrül, in the sense of supreme displays of enlightened
realization, are by contrast understood to be the real thing:
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displays of true insight into the nature of reality. Dzuntrül
in this sense are the manifestation of an enlightened state
that is framed by Drikung exegetes, and Buddhists generally, as a form of power with a completely altruistic orientation; this sets them apart from the potentially manipulative power embodied in ngödrup. As Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen elaborated in detail, dzuntrül manifest interactively, because of an interpersonal encounter between an
enlightened teacher and his or her students. Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen explained that displays of dzuntrül by
Tibetan Buddhist lamas must be understood as depending
upon three things. First, the actual enlightened realization
of the meditator, who in this context should be understood
as a lama, a teacher of others; his or her realization is the
cause of the display (rgyu). Second, the inner capacity of
the student and their karmic ties with the lama form the
condition for the display (rkyen). Third, the time must be
right for the display (dus tshod), in the English sense of the
‘time must be ripe’; this is the moment when the student is
ready and will benefit from the display.
Thus in an important sense, these displays are social in
nature, requiring an interpretive community of karmically connected witnesses and the context of a teaching
moment. Here we might think of the stingy patrons in the
yak dung story or the doubting monks as disciples to be
‘tamed’ through Amgön’s displays, their errors radically
corrected via yogic activity that exactly matches their
needs. Or perhaps it is we, the audience for the narrative, who are in fact the ones for whom transformation
is intended. The student’s (or audience’s) self-cultivation
toward Buddhahood, in this framework, can only proceed
when he or she has the model and guide of the meditator-teacher. Conversely, it is the student’s individual
karmic needs that call forth a particular display of yogic
accomplishment from the teacher. The subsequent memory-work of the student in recollecting and recounting the
enlightened deeds of her teacher then keeps that teacher’s
qualities firmly in view, as the focus of the student’s (and
the community’s) devotion and emulation. In this hermeneutics of interpersonal or communal perception, displays
of dzuntrül are always therefore about teaching, memory,
and faith (dad pa).23
For Buddhist soteriology, the first point, regarding the r alization of the lama, is structurally crucial: from the point
of view of Tibetan Buddhist exegetical traditions, the phenomena labeled dzuntrül are fundamentally expressions
of the meditator’s own direct experience of the ultimate
nature of reality. As Karma Rinchen explained, according to the Kagyu perspective of Mahāmudrā, insight into
the ultimate nature of reality and total freedom from the
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three poisons of hatred, addiction, and ignorance produces
internal changes in the meditator. The meditator’s vital
energy and mind become indivisible (rlung sems dbyer med).
Dzuntrül are an external display of this internal change;
indeed, they may be seen as proof of this internal change,
through witnessed displays of transformations of matter
and consciousness.
Dzuntrül at the level of display are not purely private; they
are interpersonal and ultimately communal events, as both
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen emphasized.24 In Karma Rinchen’s words, “For the lama the play
of enlightenment is happening all the time, but we only
notice it in dzuntrül.” That is, it is the karmically structured
needs and capacities of the disciples that literally call forth
miraculous displays from the teacher. This presentation
of dzuntrül thus hinges equally on a correct, in the Buddhist sense, understanding of karma, the Buddhist theory
of cause and effect, and on the devotional relationship
between master and disciple.
Such a presentation of dzuntrül is highly rationalized. It is
marked by internally systematic and coherent sequences
of cause and effect, and by an emphasis on interpersonal
and communal ways of knowing, rather than an appeal
to private experience. But this internal rationality is not
secular as that term is usually understood. This conceptualization of dzuntrül remains resolutely rooted in Buddhist
analytical categories and Buddhist concerns about meaning and value. This presentation of dzuntrül may therefore
hint at ways to rethink the supposedly privileged relationship between secularism and rationality. Buddhist thinkers
like my interlocutors are deploying Buddhist conceptual
tools in ways that arguably work to reclaim the terrain
of rationality (and the significant social capital that goes
with rationality) from secularists, while maintaining their
commitment to specifically Buddhist concerns.
Alternately, my interlocutors’ comments about dzuntrül
may be seen as reflecting Buddhist modernist sensibilities
here, more than specifically secular ones (in the sense
Gayley 2013 and McMahan 2008 use the term). Seen in that
light, their analysis of dzuntrül offers a reworking of inherited Buddhist analytic motifs for the purpose of addressing contemporary social and intellectual concerns, while
nevertheless continuing to offer an intentional alternative
to secular modes of discourse.
Karma Rinchen and Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen elaborated
important implications of understanding dzuntrül as both
an expression of enlightenment and as profoundly interpersonal, both in the sense of being communally legible
and karmically conditioned. Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen

explained that a manifestation of dzuntrül should not be
understood as an expression of selfish intention on the
part of the lama-meditator. Rather, the lama-meditator
is understood here to be a bodhisattva practitioner, someone who has taken binding vows to constantly benefit
others, and whose conduct has become the spontaneous
fulfillment of these bodhisattva vows. For such a person,
displaying dzuntrül is not a calculated act. Instead, it occurs
whenever such a display would be helpful to the witnesses, whose own personalities, karmic makeup, and needs
condition what occurs. This offers a gloss for the stories of
Amgön Rinpoche above: the stingy family in the yak dung
story is challenged precisely in their stinginess; the disbelieving monks at the monastery are dazzled and subdued
in their willful attempts to get rid of Amgön Rinpoche;
the arrogant Reting Rinpoche is humbled by a clairvoyant
power greater than his own.
The spontaneous character of such dzuntrül displays is significant, according to Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, because
it is thus possible to distinguish between dzuntrül arising
out of (and clearly indicating) authentic Buddhist insight
and accomplishment on the Buddhist path, versus either
hallucinations arising in meditation, or manipulative or illusory performances of magical illusion or of ngödrup. Making this distinction between valid and validating Buddhist
displays and fake or irrelevant displays by charlatans or
practitioners of non-Buddhist techniques is a long-standing Buddhist concern (Gethin 2012; Strong 2007). Tibetan
life story and meditation instruction genres of literature
and oral narrative emphasize the need for critical discernment on the part of any meditator, both to correctly
distinguish false, demonic, or hallucinatory experiences
from real moments of insight, and to correctly choose a
trustworthy teacher who is not a charlatan, and who can
lead one to enlightenment.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen offered a classic Buddhist
interpretation of when dzuntrül can manifest and how
disciples can evaluate both yogic displays by their teacher
and experiences arising in their own meditation. He
explained that where dzuntrül displays would “benefit the
minds of sentient beings” then it is acceptable to show
them; by contrast, in situations where dzuntrül would
confuse or mislead sentient beings, then they are not to
be shown. Similarly, a meditator can test experiences that
may arise in meditation to see if they stabilize in specific
Buddhist ways. According to Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen,
a real visionary experience will increase in strength and
clarity the more the meditator concentrates on emptiness
and the altruistic spirit of bodhicitta. But a demonic
obstacle or hallucination will fade after meditation on

emptiness and bodhicitta, and then one knows it was just an
obstacle. Dzuntrül-like displays likewise can be checked for
authenticity by ascertaining whether they benefit beings
and reflect enlightened qualities
Yet while this is a classic Buddhist presentation, Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen gave an unusual analogy for it, saying,
“This is just like a fake Apple phone made by the Chinese.
The fake phone will break when used — it won’t perform
its function, revealing itself to be a copy rather than the
real thing.” That is, fake realizations will disappear when
you try to develop them by meditating on emptiness or
bodhicitta; they will not perform the functions of enlightenment and benefit for sentient beings. Dzuntrül can be
evaluated in similar ways. The recommendation to check
whether a meditative practice ‘works’ is of course classic
Buddhist advice. But Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s framing
of this classic advice in the language of phone knock-offs
takes the implications one step further. In the Chinese
phone analogy, we get not only a possible critique of
the supposed wonders of the Chinese economy and the
benefits it brings to Tibetans, but we also get an implicit
reminder not to assume that a ‘modern’ product like an
Apple phone has any privileged relationship to the real,
authentic, functional, or useful.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s use of the fake Apple phone
analogy suggests his and his students’ familiarity with the
desires and experiences of technological modernity, which
in his comments elsewhere he identifies as one conte porary source of social capital to be reckoned with. Yet in
his analogy, it is the wondrous technological product, the
Apple phone, which may turn out to be a fake. External or
technological modernity is no proof against charlatanry,
illusion, or fraud; only personal investigation (trying to
make a phone call) can show whether something is real in
the sense of whether it works.
The Age of Faith and the Age of Knowledge
In his distinctive intellectual style of recalibrating categories of tradition and modernity, Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen
verbalized a conceptual sequence linking a meditator’s
capacity to display dzuntrül, the Buddhist tradition of
devotional reading, and the diasporic and modern need
for ‘Himalayan Buddhists’ to remember their past. He
elaborated these ideas around the very old and centrally
important Buddhist technical term ‘recollection’ (Skt. smṛti, Tib. dran ba). This term has a range of meanings but can
refer both to that recollection which is often translated as
‘mindfulness,’ i.e. the opposite of distraction, as well as to
the recollections of devotional practice and memory, in
the sense of not-forgetting (Gyatso 1992).
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In Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s exegesis, a Buddhist life
story, whether oral or written, centers on recollection of
several kinds: For the lama-meditator who is the subject
of the life story, recollection refers to their own inner
qualities and yogic realizations, as they are never ‘distracted’ from the true nature of reality. At the level of the
reader/listener (positioned as the student), Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen says recollection refers to their devotional
focus on the teacher they are reading about. In Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen’s explanation, recollection through the act
of reading or listening to Buddhist biographies becomes a
process in which the student, within a devotional framework, literally takes on the teacher’s qualities, becoming more and more like the teacher. (Therefore, as the
Khenchen pointed out, one must choose one’s Buddhist
biographical reading/listening carefully, so as develop the
qualities one actually wants. This was a point also echoed
by Karma Rinchen.) Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen further
noted that recollection through practices of reading and
remembering teachers is crucial for the continuity of the
lineage itself. In the context of lineage then, this suggests
that recollection is a kind of historical remembering,
insuring the continuity of an unbroken chain of lineage
memory across both geography and time (Hervieu-Leger
2000). Both Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma Rinchen
emphasized that such remembering is important both
for diaspora Tibetans and Tibetans in geographic Tibet.
Recollection in this sense thus also speaks directly to the
concerns about broken links of memory voiced by Dordzin
Rinpoche.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen contrasted the reading practices
and attitudes towards yogic power of previous generations
of Tibetan Buddhists in Himalayan societies with the attitudes of people today. He stated that “Himalayan people
had strange ideas previously — lay people didn’t read [religious biographies] and similar things. A layperson might
say, ‘I’m a Drikungpa’ but they didn’t know much about
it. Reading was work for monks and nuns. But now, after
1959, now Himalayan [lay] people will read and study.”
This perspective in some sense is a modernist one (McMahan 2008); in this context the international pressures and
new educational institutions of the post-1959 world are
seen to produce the benefit of greater lay participation in
Buddhist life, and new engagements with forms of Buddhist identity. ‘I’m a Drikungpa’ means something different in this setting, according to Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen,
than it did before, and that difference is connected to new
practices of knowledge.
But this new community of lay readers is also a community of Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhists who make
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new judgments about the validity and trustworthiness of
Buddhist masters. Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen and Karma
Rinchen both argued that members of the ‘new generation’
combine their novel experiences of ‘international’ diaspora and cross-cultural encounters with new experiences
of learning, literacy, and technology. As a result, these
Drikung scholars say, contemporary Drikung people, and
Tibetan Buddhists more generally, evaluate accounts of
yogic power according to new criteria of plausibility and
rationality. These new lay readers may not be impressed
by accounts of yogic power in the same ways as previous
generations. In fact, for some Himalayan people, as Karma
Rinchen mentioned when talking about Amgön Rinpoche
and the yak dung, accounts of yogic power may provoke
concerns about being criticized for believing in magic.
The post-1959 shifts in who reads, and how they understand what they read, are central to Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen’s most powerful theoretical formulation. He
suggests a new periodization of Tibetan Buddhist intellectual and religious life, a periodization that intervenes
directly in questions of modernity and secularism. In his
words, “The time before 1959 was the ‘age of faith’ (dad pa’i
dus rabs), and the time after 1959 is the ‘age of knowledge’
(shes rab gyi dus rabs). So one needs to know.” In this formulation, the ages of faith and knowledge form a historical
sequence, interrupted yet linked by the transformations
of 1959. In the present day, one needs to know more (facts,
information, biographical material) in order to find and
trust the Buddhist path and a Buddhist teacher. Indeed,
present day people may simply not have the same capacity
for faith that earlier generations had. “In earlier times,”
according to Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, “the display of
dzuntrül by lamas was an opportunity to develop great
faith in the lama.” But now the situation is different: in
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s words, “In our present time, a
lama might display dzuntrül, but the disciples won’t believe
it very much — believing it is a little bit difficult.”
In a similar vein, we might think of Karma Rinchen’s
comment when listening to the recording of Dordzin
Rinpoche’s account of Amgön’s deeds: “There used to be
many such lamas. But now people don’t believe it.” This
statement may suggest a sense of diminishing capacities in
the present generation, but that was not Karma Rinchen’s
main point. Rather, he emphasized that every generation
is culturally and intellectually distinctive, and that this
extends to the ways they tell stories and recall the past.
As he put it, “In Milarepa’s time, people had different
ways of thinking, just like their ways of talking and eating,
etc. were different.” As people’s habits and preferences
changed, “the stories changed over time, just like Milare-

pa’s namthar and how it is told changed.” Thus the people
of today have their own needs and capacities, which must
be addressed.
According to Karma Rinchen, these generational shifts
are actually part of why Amgön Rinpoche’s biography is
important for present day Himalayan people and for Buddhists in general. Amgön’s life story is less historically remote and alien than earlier masters like Milarepa, and people know Amgön was a real historical person. At the same
time, both Karma Rinchen and Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen,
as well as other Tibetan scholars and practitioners I spoke
with, suggested that it is no accident that the life of Amgön
Rinpoche is being memorialized in textual biographies and
oral narratives specifically with accounts of his dzuntrül: because he is one generation away, but only one, he
challenges the incredulity of contemporary readers and
listeners while opening up the possibility of faith. He is historically traceable, no figment of the imagination, but not
actually, troublingly present.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s ‘age of knowledge’ in many
ways appears as a secular age (with a nod to Charles Taylor). It might seem to be an age in which faith has diminished or vanished, replaced perhaps by a Tibetan form of
secular skepticism. This secular skepticism might seem to
be partly about new forms of knowledge, and partly about
the present generation’s desire to distance itself from associations with magic and other categories of non-modernity that they know are stigmatized. But crucially, for the
Drikung exegetes I spoke with, the present ‘age of knowledge’ is in fact one in which faith may have changed shape
or become more difficult, but in which the role of faith as
necessary in Buddhist practice has not shifted.
According to these Buddhist scholars, faith in the lama
is crucial for real soteriological progress on the Buddhist
path. Such faith is precisely the quality developed by
reading or listening to life stories of masters and through
recollection. Indeed, here faith, knowledge, and recollection go together: one needs to know the lineage well if
one aims to generate the necessary devotion. Moreover,
Himalayan and Tibetan people specifically ‘need to know’
their own religious and cultural pasts in order not to lose
access to them. There is a strong suggestion, in tandem
with Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s other comments, that
present-day Tibetan Buddhists in Himalayan societies both
inside and outside geographic Tibet ‘need to know’ how
to learn and know things in specifically Tibetan Buddhist
ways. They need to maintain modes of knowledge which,
though now potentially open to all in Himalayan societies including lay people, ironically may be overlooked or
shunned in the present day, because of competition from

new international, modern, secular modes of knowing and
learning, which are so closely associated with status and
power. Here we might think of Foucault’s comments about
the intimate relationship between knowledge and power in
a society. “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general
politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it
accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault in Rabinow
1984: 73). In these terms, one could say that the scholars
I discuss here are deeply invested in the question of what
regimes and discourses of truth will operate for Himalayan
Buddhists.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen states that in his view, the ideal
would be: “Fifty percent faith, fifty percent knowledge —
the key is half and half. Before there was too much faith
and too little knowledge, now there is too little faith.” The
‘need to know’ is thus in part about correctly balancing
knowledge and faith. From the side of the lamas, Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen asserts, the capacity for dzuntrül is already
there; it’s the disciples who are questionable. “For doing
dzuntrül, the foundation is a connection with a disciple
who has faith. If we don’t have 100 percent [English term]
faith, then we won’t really be able to perceive the lama’s
dzuntrül … The lama has the capacity for dzuntrül. So saying there are or are not dzuntrül — really the basis is the
connection with the disciple who has faith.” Here we may
perceive a suggestion that present day people are better at
cultivating faith for figures of the past than for troublingly
present figures of our own time. Or perhaps Khenchen N ima Gyaltsen’s suggestion is rather that reading/hearing
narratives like those about Amgön is a kind of training in
faith for present day skeptics.
At the same time, as Karma Rinchen and Khenchen Nyima
Gyaltsen both described, this faith must be the right kind
of faith, the faith of knowledge (shes rab gyi dad pa) and
explicitly not blind faith, the faith of ignorance (rmong dad
pa). This latter opposition is again not new; it is a distinction Tibetans attribute to the historical Buddha. But in the
contemporary Himalayan and diasporic context, the ‘faith
of knowledge’ takes on new meanings. It is the faith verified by ‘checking’ brtag dpyad byed pa) via a hermeneutic
of communal (and sometimes technological) evaluation as
well as individual karmic capacity. In this Tibetan Buddhist
context, the secular age has been reframed around an
internal rationality incorporating devotion, faith, and the
tangible presence of masters whose enlightenment can be
displayed through activity.
We might observe in closing that Drikung intellectuals
asserting continuity with the past within the new ‘age of
knowledge’ turn out to be far from marginal figures in
global debates about secularism. Increasingly, scholars in
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multiple international locations speak of ‘post-secularism,’ and new forms of ‘religion-making’ as integral to the
realities of the contemporary world (Dressler and Mandair
2011). Some scholars argue that the ‘secular’ is itself not
separable from the religious, or highlight ritual dimensions of secular practices, for instance in modern national
politics and sports. Some have attempted an anthropology
of secularism itself, questioning the presumed naturalness
and privileged realism or rationality of the secular (Asad
2003). These revaluations of secularism often also question
the very idea that modernity is characterized by a break
with the past, or even that modernity exists as a separate space at all (Hervieu-Léger 2000; Latour 1993). Such
questions echo Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s questions, and
some speak to his answers.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen’s formulation of the ‘need to
know’ in the ‘age of knowledge’ emerges as a Buddhist
response to claims and judgments of international secularism. In his assertion that Himalayan Buddhists must
learn how to ‘know’ things in explicitly Buddhist ways,
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen points to a new era in which
crucial continuity with the past remains. Most of all, I
would argue, Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, Dordzin Rinpoche, Karma Rinchen and other contemporary Tibetan
Buddhist intellectuals assert throughout all the interventions I discuss here the validity and ‘adequacy’ (Asad 2003)
of Tibetan Buddhist forms of life. In so doing, their arguments reveal the terrain of secularism, like the terrain of
religion, as a landscape not only of knowledge, but also of
power.
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Endnotes
1. In this article I discuss the Tibetan terms dngos grub
and rdzu ‘phrul and the corresponding Sanskrit terms
siddhi and ṛddhi, which I define below. I avoid the English
term ‘miracle’ to translate any of these terms, since the
semantic field of the English term differs substantially
from the Tibetan or Sanskrit. My thanks to Khenpo
Kunga Sherab for highlighting this issue (personal
communication, November 2014).
2. The Kagyu school is one of the four main branches of
Tibetan Buddhism active today. The Drikung Kagyu is
one of the leading Kagyu sub-lineages surviving into the
present. It was founded by Kyoba Jikden Sumgon (Skyob pa
’jig rten gsum mgon, 1143-1217), who established Drikung
Til Monastery (‘Bri gung mthil dgon pa) in Central Tibet in
1179. See Gruber 2010; Dkon mchog rgya mtsho 2004b.
3. I do not discuss the Tibet-based intellectual dynamics
in this article because of concerns regarding the current
sensitive situation for Tibetan intellectuals in geographic
Tibet, as well as for reasons of length. I hope to discuss
these dynamics in a separate essay in the future.
4. Dkon mchog rgya mtsho 2004a; ‘Bri gung pa chos ‘byor
1996.
5. Konchok Gyatso, who also uses the name Rase Dawa (Ra
se zla ba), has contributed in major ways to contemporary
Drikung intellectual life, in particular through his many
historical and biographical publications.
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6. For instance, Konchok Gyatso the author of the 2004
Tibetan biography of Amgön Rinpoche which I discuss
here, also published a biography of a close contemporary
of Amgön’s, Drikung Pachung Rinpoche (‘Bri gung Dpa’
chung rin po che, 1901-1988) in 2004. This biography of
Pachung Rinpoche contains virtually no depictions of yogic
power.
7. See Pitkin 2011, forthcoming. DiValerio 2015: 93, 261
n. 39-40 offers an excellent discussion of the ideas of a
Tibetan Buddhist yogic ‘imaginaire’ and ‘repertoire’ on
which virtuosos and interpretive communities draw.
8. Ardussi and Epstein 1975, Stearns 2007, Quintman 2014;
DiValerio 2015, in particular Chapter 7, which briefly
discusses Amgön Rinpoche and Konchog Gyatso, the
author of the 2004 rnam thar.
9. Unless otherwise noted all interviews were conducted
in Tibetan. All translations here are my own. I discussed
difficult points of meaning and interpretation in Dordzin
Rinpoche’s stories with Karma Rinchen and another
Tibetan friend, based on my audio recordings of Dordzin
Rinpoche’s stories. I conducted separate interviews
with Karma Rinchen about yogic accomplishment and
interpretation, and separate interviews with Khenchen
Nyima Gyaltsen.
10. I explore the main Indian and other sources of
influence on such Tibetan taxonomies in a separate study.
The most common Tibetan taxonomy of ngödrup are the
sets of eight ‘mundane’ (thun mong) ngödrup (Skt. siddhi),
‘mundane’ in the sense of different from the supreme
siddhi of Buddhahood. See for instance Gethin 2012. Dung
dkar 1981: 755, gives a standard list: eye potion, swift-feet,
sword, travels to terrestrial realms, magic pills, travels to
celestial realms, invisibility, essence extract. (“mig sman/
rkang mgyogs/ ral gri/ sa ‘og / ril bu/ mkha’ spyod/ mi snang
ba/ bcud len”).
11. This story is reminiscent of a famous episode from
the Life of Milarepa in which Milarepa astounds his closest
disciple by placing himself inside a hollow yak horn,
without either making himself smaller or the yak horn
bigger. Kagyu audiences in particular would notice the
connection. See Quintman 2014.
12. In this context, Karma Rinchen and Dordzin Rinpoche
explained the term rnam thar as being an account of a
practitioner’s liberation, intended, as they emphasized
and as I explore below, as a model of Buddhist practice
for others. They did not address distinctions between oral
or textual material in this conversation (i.e., whether to
define rnam thar as a specifically textual literary genre).
They contrasted rnam thar with the category of ‘folktale’
or sgrung in this discussion both on the basis of the

perceived reliability of rnam thar in contrast to the mythic
quality of sgrung, and because of the explicitly Buddhist
soteriological intention of rnam thar.
13. On social capital see for instance Bourdieu 1984.
14. Relatedly see Aihwa Ong’s comments on transnational
identities of Cambodian refugees in the US (Ong 2003).
15. While claims that the events of the twentieth century
“brought modernity” to Tibet are often made in Chinese,
English, and sometimes Tibetan language contexts, such
claims overlook the multiple dynamics associated with
modernity present in Tibetan social and intellectual life
prior to the 1950s. See Gyatso 2004, 2015; Lopez 1998, 2005;
Hansen 2003.
16. Shakya 2000: 29; “underdevelopment” is his translation
of rjes lus. ‘Backwardness’ is another common rendering in
English.
17. See Berger 1967, 1974; subsequently he critiques this
view (i.e., 2005); Gauchet, 1985/tr. 1997; Casanova 1994,
2011; McMahan 2008, Dressler and Mandair 2011, Bubandt
and van Beek 2012.
18. Almond 1988; Ivy 2005; McMahan 2008; Zablocki
2009; note critiques in Blackburn 2010 and Turner
2014. Contemporary collaborations between Buddhist
meditators and neuroscientists, for instance, may be
mobilized to emphasize Buddhist rationalism. Many
Buddhist scholars including people with whom I worked on
this article emphasize the internal rationality of Buddhist
teachings, practices and ideas. However, in many instances
this Buddhist rationality includes space for activities and
narratives that secularists appear uncomfortable with.
An extreme secularist position is articulated by neoatheist Sam Harris in Tricycle Magazine in 2006, urging that
Buddhists stop labeling Buddhism as a religion.
19. For the nineteenth century British scholars Almond
describes, Buddhist ritual and apotropaic practices
appeared incompatible with full civilization (Almond
1988). Bubandt and van Beek (2012) describe related
concerns within Thai secularism.
20. This construction happened under the auspices of the
37th Drikung Chetsang Rinpoche, one of the two leaders
of the lineage (‘Bri gung che tshang dkon chog bstan
‘dzin kun bzang ‘phrin las lhun grub, b. 1946). The other
leader of the lineage, the 36th Chungtsang Rinpoche (‘Bri
gung chung tshang rin po che bstan ‘dzin chos kyi snang
ba, b. 1942), remains in Tibet. Since the mid-seventeenth
century, the Drikung Kagyu lineage leadership has been
shared between two incarnation lineages, the Chetsang
and Chungtsang Rinpoches. For more detail see Gruber 2010;
Dkon mchog rgya mtsho 2004b.
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21. Drikung Til Monastery in Central Tibet also historically
serves this function, and remains the prime place of
pilgrimage for many lineage members. However the
current Tibetan situation complicates its use as a gathering
place for the multiple branches of the lineage, although for
certain special occasions it may still retain this role. See
Kapstein 1998.
22. However, the category of magical illusion can also be
a fertile realm of display and transformation for Indian
and Tibetan Buddhist thinkers writing both in tantric
and sutric contexts. I explore elsewhere the tantalizing
question of how and when the creative play of magical
illusion may be invoked in displays of yogic power.
23. I thank Holly Gayley for the apt term ‘hermeneutics of
perception.’
24. This presentation echoes the classic Buddhist
formulation of the three bodies of a buddha: The ‘truth
body’ (Skt. dharmakāya) expresses a buddha’s own
enlightenment at the level of enlightened experience, and
the two levels of ‘form body’ (Skt. rupakāya) represent the
interactive, teaching aspects of an enlightened being’s
activity toward others. Much Buddhist literature on
form bodies deals with technical aspects of display and
transformation, both relevant to Tibetan presentations of
yogic display, which I consider in detail elsewhere.

Interviews
Dordzin Drupon Dondrup Palden Rinpoche, April 2013,
Dehradun, India.
Khenchen Nyima Gyaltsen, April 2013, Dehradun, India.
Karma Rinchen, September-October 2014, New York City.
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